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MANSFIELD AND BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES
JULIAN S. WATERMAN*
I THE eighteenth century, a period when prose came to a higher
excellence than it had yet attained in England, Blackstone, who
lived from 1723 to 178o, rendered an unparalleled service for ju-
risprudence' in writing the Commentaries, "the prose epic of the com-
mon law.' ' 2 It has been said of this work, published from 1765 to 1769 and
based on lectures at Oxford from 1753 to i766,3 that the Continent derived
its knowledge of English law chiefly from it, that on it the study of law in
England was based, and that in America the work was regarded as the re-
pository of the common law.4 Of Mansfield, who lived from 1705 to 1793,
it has been said that he was not only the greatest common law judge but
the greatest judge in Anglo-American legal history.5 An eminent Ameri-
can legal scholar said of him that "he broke down the narrow barrier of the
common law" and redeemed it from "feudal selfishness and barbarity,"
that "he was one of those great men raised up by Providence, at a fortu-
nate moment, to effect a salutary revolution in the world," and that "he
became, what he intended, the jurist of the commercial world ..... "6
What were the relations in eighteenth century London between these
two, the scholarly Blackstone,7 the first university lecturer on the laws of
Dean, School of Law, University of Arkansas.
x Pancoast, English Literature (3d ed. 1907), 403. See also Gosse, History of Eighteenth
Century Literature (1891), 307; Seccombe, The Age of Johnson (19I4), i52; Spittal, Samuel
Johnson (1923), 326; Trevelyan, History of England (1929), 514.
2Gregory, Lord Mansfield, Rep. Bar Assn. of Ark. 83, 90 (1912).
Preface, i Bl. Comm.; Clitherow, Memoirs, i Win. BI. Rep. xvii (781); Roscoe, Eminent
British Lawyers (1830), 251; Odgers, Blackstone, 27 Yale L. Jour. 599, 611 (1918). The resig-
nation from Oxford is set as 1763 by Douglas, Biographical History of Blackstone (1782), 26,
45 and i Hammond, Blackstone (i8go), 57.
4 Brunner, Sources of the Law of England (Hastie's trans. 1888), 45.
S Willis, Anglo-American Law (192 6 ), 153. Mansfield was chief justice of the King's Bench
from 1756 to 1788.
6 Story, Miscellaneous Writings (835), 262.
7Dillon, Laws and Jurisprudence of England and America (I895), 3io. Sir William Black-
stone is "one of the most eminent literary characters that the present age has produced." Ed-
ward Malone, Advertisement in the 1780 Supplement to Shakespeare's Plays (Johnson's and
Steevens' ed., 1778), iii. See i Sharswood, Blackstone (1869), xvi, and 8 Foss, Judges of Eng-
land (1864), 250, for Blackstone's other literary contributions, in addition to the notes on
Shakespeare used by Malone. See also supra note r.
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England,8 and the urbane Mansfield, a judge whose career was an epoch
in English juridical history;9 between one who, to many, is the embodi-
ment of devotion to legal orthodoxy and the opponent of every legal re-
form,' 0 and the other, the exemplar of judicial, if not political, liberalism?"
Despite the difference in their legal temperament, the fact that Mansfield's
classical tastes caused him to prefer the society of scholars to that of mem-
bers of his profession 2 may have led to an acquaintanceship with the
academic Blackstone, or perhaps their common interest in legal education
fostered a friendship between the two. 3
II
It has been said that Mansfield, as patron, 4 discovered and turned to
public usefulness the genius of Blackstone, then a young lawyer.'Y When
Blackstone, in 1753 at the age of thirty, finally decided to abandon his
London practice for an academic life, partly because the profits from his
profession were less than his expenses, it was Mansfield, the solicitor-
general, who supported his application for the professorship of Roman law
at Oxford. The place, however, went to one with the proper political bias
after Blackstone had refused to do other than give law lectures to the best
of his ability., 6
8 Warren, History of the American Bar (i9ii), 177 n. 2.
9 Story, supra note 6, 261.
"0 Dillon, supra note 7, 297; Dicey, The Relation between Law and Public Opinion in Eng-
land (1917), 62, 70, 126; Hicks, Men and Books Famous in the Law (i92i), 122.
21 Pound, Interpretations of Legal History (1923), 47, i4o; Dicey, supra note io, 166; Ros-
coe, supra note 3, 191.
12 Roscoe, supra note 3, 171; Boswell, Samuel Johnson (Mod. Lib. ed. 1931), 402.
3 lIzfra note 54. Chief Justice Mansfield set aside space in the courtroom for students and
stated the cases for their benefit. i Warren, History of the Harvard Law School (i9o8), 124.
Jeremy Bentham, as a student, came to hear Mansfield, then "the head of the gods" of his
idolatry. i Works of Bentham (Bowring's ed. 1843), 247. See infra notes 23, 37.
See Holliday, Life of Mansfield (i797), 12-23 for two letters written by Mansfield about
1730 on the study of history. In x774 Mansfield briefly outlined in a letter a course preparatory
to the study of law. ig European Magazine 418 (1791). 2 Watt, Bibliotheca Brittannica
(1824), 641 f. refers to a "Treatise on the Study of Law, containing Directions to Students
written by Lord Manfield and ... [others] in a Series of Letters (1797)." Holliday's biography,
it is said, is by 'universal consent one of the most dull and inaccurate in the language." Buchan,
Lord Mansfield, 88 Atl. Monthly 777, 778 (i9o).
14 1 Works of James Wilson (Andrews' ed. 1895), 54 n.; 383 n. 2. Bentham says Lord Shel-
bumne was "Blackstone's making." i Works of Bentham 249. Cf. i Fitzmaurice, Life of Shel-
burne (1875), 312; Everett, infra note 23, 121.
s 3 Campbell, Lives of the Chief Justices (1873), 274.
16 Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution (1930), 82, 201; Odgers, supra
note 3, 603. The prime minister appointed the Regius Professor of Roman Law, as the place
was "crown patronage." Holdsworth, Blackstone, 7 Ore. L. Rev. 155 , 257 (1927).
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It has also been stated that then, on the advice of Mansfield,' 7 Black-
stone decided to read lectures on English law, without a university ap-
pointment, to such students as were disposed to attend them at Oxford.
But Blackstone indicates that he conceived of the novel plan of teaching
English law in a university and despite prejudices against educational
innovations was encouraged by those in the university and out of it.5
Perhaps Mansfield was one of those out of the University who encouraged
him in his private undertaking, which led to his election in 1758 as the
first Vinerian professor of law at Oxford. Certainly when the professional-
ly obscure Blackstone wished to leave the practice to become a university
lecturer, Mansfield, who was politically influential, desired to aid him in
achieving his ambition.
Mansfield's reactions to the published lectures of Blackstone were ap-
parently contradictory. Blackstone stated in a letter of February, 1766,
that Mansfield had done him the honor to mark out a few of the many
errors in Book One which was published in 1765.'9 Mansfield, usually
critical of "the authorities, ' ' 20 highly approved of the Commentaries for
law students, as he said there they would find analytical reasoning diffused
in a pleasing style and that he knew no other work to recommend to
them.21 Yet Bentham stated in 1828 in the historical introduction to the
second edition of A Fragment on Government,22 a work which appeared
17 MacDonell, Blackstone, 2 Dict. Nat. Biog. (i9o8), 586; 3 Mallet, History of the Univ.
of Oxford (1928), 127 n. 3.
18 Preface, i B1. Comm. Clitherow, supra note 3, xxix, states that Blackstone resided chiefly
at Oxford from 1750 to 1756, while composing his lectures. Sharswood, supra note 7, xii, and
Welsby, English Judges (1846), 333, state that Blackstone planned his lectures on English law
about 1750. Since Blackstone began his lectures in 1753 he no doubt had been working on
them before that year. See Douglas, supra note 3, I4; 4 Encyc. Brit. (IWth ed. 1926), 25;
Odgers, supra note 3, 6o4; Holdsworth, Blackstone, 4 Camb. L. J. 261, 262, 271 (1932). In
the preface, however, Blackstone states that "his original plan took its rise in the year 1753."
Perhaps Mansfield and others suggested in 1753 that Blackstone read the lectures on Eng-
lish law which he was preparing. Foss, suptra note 7, 246; Holliday, supra note 13, 89. It is
often stated that it was Mansfield who furnished Blackstone the idea of lectures on English
law. Hicks, supra note 1o, 1o9; Warren, supra note 8, 178 n.; Willis, supra note 5, 155; Holds-
worth, Charles Viner, 39 L. Quar. Rev. 17, 23 n. 4 (X923).
9 Memoirs of Wilmot (1802), 71-72. Blackstone's two letters on the Commentaries to Mr.
Justice Wilmot were dated Feb. 22 and May 2, 1766, when Wilmot was still on the King's
Bench with Mansfield. See inifra notes 33, 64.
20 Roscoe, supra note 3, 248; Wallace, infra note 43, 29.
21 Holliday, supra note 13, 89, does not give the date of Mansfield's remark. Dicey, Black-
stone's Commentaries, 4 Camb. L. Jour. 286, 287 (1932), states that the remark was made
about 1767. The fourth book of the Commentaries was not published until 1769.
- i Works of Bentham 240. The second edition of the Fragment, published in 1823, did
not contain the historical preface.
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anonymously in 1776, that Mansfield was delighted by the attack on the
Commentaries, an attack largely on the constitutional principles set forth
in the introduction to Book One rather than on the work as a whole.2 3
These apparently inconsistent views of Mansfield, if he held them, can be
reconciled as Mansfield could recommend the work as an introductory
text for the study of "municipal law," since suitable ones were not avail-
able, and still disapprove of the constitutional principles set forth in the
introduction. 24
This disapprobation, if it existed, was hardly consistent with Mans-
field's political philosophy. Mansfield has been considered by many as one
of the leaders in the English government who fostered just prior to the
Revolution reactionary foreign policies antagonistic to the American col-
onies.25 In fact John Quincy Adams in 1829 charged him with being more
responsible for the Revolution than any other man.21 Blackstone, while
23 Ibid., 246. The Fragment in addition to containing an examination of the subject of gov-
ernment as set forth in the introduction to the Commentaries also included a short preface in
which was given a critique of the work at large.
"Lord Mansfield was a rank and intolerant Tory ..... He lauded the 'Fragment on
Government,' not because he understood or admired the philosophy, but because it wounded
Blackstone, with whom he had had a quarrel." Memoirs, io Works of Bentham 121. Ben-
tham's early admiration for Mansfield waned, as in x828 he stated that the principles in the
Fragment on Government stood in direct opposition to the biases of "the great Ultra-Tory."
i Works of Bentham 248.
"Mansfield praised it, according to Bentham, because he disliked Blackstone." Bentham.
Fragment on Government (Montague's ed. i8gi), 6, editor's introd. See also Everett, The
Education of Bentham (1931), 97. Bentham also said, about 1826, that Mansfield could not
bear Blackstone. The remark refers to the period about 1776. 2 Writings of Legar6 (1845),
452; io Works of Bentham 555. Bentham stated that when the Fragment appeared anony-
mously it was attributed by some to Mansfield. Supra note 22.
24 Mr. Justice James Wilson in his law lectures in 1790 said the public law in the Com-
mentaries should be consulted with cautious prudence but the work should be read and studied,
i Works of Wilson (Wilson's ed. 1804), 21-22.
For a discussion of Mansfield's Tory views, see Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and Black-
stone's Commentaries, 27 II. L. Rev. 629, 642 (1933). Jefferson considered Mansfield's legal
innovations "sly poison" and dangerous to a free country, because he disapproved of judicial
usurpation of legislative powers and of a non-elected judiciary curbing the jury, that "in-
estimable institution" which represented the people in the judicial branch. Ibid., 643; 4 Works
of Jefferson (Ford's ed. 1904), 479, a letter of x789. Jefferson also disliked Mansfield's political
views. Infra note 27.
25 Andrews, The Colonial Background of the American Revolution (i 94), 208; Howard.
Preliminaries of the Revolution (igo6), 165; Mansfield, Political Chief Justice, 107 Law Times
325 (i899); i Flanders, Lives of the Chief Justices (i855), 51i; i Cambridge History of British
Empire (1929), 632; Adams, Political Ideas of the American Revolution (1922), 24, 76; i
Cooley, Blackstone (Andrews' ed. i899), 96 n. 4, 97 n. 2, 144 n. 2; The Plea of the Colonies on
Charges Brought against Them by Lord M---d and Others (1775).
26 Letters of John Quincy Adams in 2 Life and Letters of Joseph Story (W. W. Story's ed.,
185i), 12, 2o. Hertz, The Old Colonial System (1905), iSo; Holliday, supra note 13, 247.
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not politically prominent, was considered by Jefferson"7 as having pro-
duced in the Commentaries an anti-republican work which expressed the
abhorrent political viewss of those in England, including Mansfield, who
were opposed to democratic government.2
9
There are statements, much later it is true than Bentham's acid remark
printed in 1828, which cast doubt on the assertion that Mansfield was de-
lighted with the indictment of the Commentaries, a delight, which if it
existed must have come from the attack on the constitutional principles
contained in the introduction to the work, as Mansfield had approved of
it as a text. James DeWitt Andrews stated that Blackstone's definition
of law,3° described by Mr. Justice James Wilson 3' in 179o as despotic and
dangerous, was merely an echo of the political opinions of Mansfield.32
The same writer stated that Blackstone's view on the power of parlia-
ment over the American colonies in the first edition of Book One in 1765
contained nothing to which patriotic Americans could object, but that in
1766, in the second edition of Book One, the statements were changed to
conform to the opinion of Mansfield and the predominant ministry in
England. 33
27 See X Works of Jefferson (Ford's ed. 1904), 456, a letter of 1826 to James Madison, where
Jefferson refers to "the honied Mansfieldism of Blackstone."
...... the high ideas of the royal prerogative with which Murray [Lord Mansfield] was in
after life identified were doubtless due to his early training." Rigg, William Murray, 13 Dict.
Nat. Biog. (909), 1307. See also Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 Yale L.
Jour. 523, 534 (1922); Stansbury, Report of the Trial of James H. Peck (i883), 92; 3 Lecky,
England in the Eighteenth Century (1883), 54, 431.
28 For Blackstone's failure to discuss constitutional law under a separate title, see Cart-
wright, An Appeal on the Subject of the English Constitution (1797), 28; Dicey, Constitutional
Law (4 th ed. 1893), 7; 2 Austin, Jurisprudence (Campbell's ed. x874), 173.
29 Andrews, supra note 25. In 1784 in The King v. Shipley, 4 Doug. 73, 172, Mr. Justice
Willes, in citing the Commentaries, said "Mr. Justice Blackstone, we all know, was an anti-
Republican lawyer." Erskine as counsel in the same case said: "Mr. Justice Blackstone, by
no means biassed towards democratical government .... " Ibid., iii.
30 1 Bl. Comm.* 44. See Bigelow, Definition of Law, 5 Col. L. Rev. i, 3 (19o5).
1 x Wilson, supra note 14, x59 n.
3 Ibid., 54 n. See also i Hammond, supra note 3, 112.
33 Andrews, American Law (igoo), § 42. Andrews gives Hammond as his authority for this
statement. i Wilson, supra note 14, i9, editor's note; i Hammond, supra note 3, 275.
Blackstone wrote on Feb. 22, 1766, to Mr. Justice Wilmot that Mansfield had suggested
certain changes in Book One after its publication. In the preface to the second edition of Book
One, dated Nov. 2, 1766, there is no reference to assistance from Mansfield or Wilmot. Infra
note 64.
i Hammond, supra note 3, 277, states that the reference to the threefold classification of the
colonies first appeared in the second edition of Book One, published in Nov., 1766. Previously
on Feb. 3, 1766, Mansfield in a speech in the House of Lords on the American colonies made a
similar classification. See Holliday, supra note 13, 242, 244; 16 Hansard, Parliamentary His-
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It seems odd that Mansfield, in view of his political philosophy and his
place in the English government, should have been pleased in 1776 with
Bentham's attacks on the constitutional principles appearing in the in-
troduction to the Commentaries. Even stranger is this delight if Mans-
field's definition of law appeared in the first edition of Book One and his
view on the relation of parliament to the colonies, a great issue in England
before 1776, was inserted in the second edition of Book One in 1766. By
1776 had the friendly relationship between Blackstone and Mansfield
ceased?34
III
Blackstone on February 9 th, 177o, after his success as a lecturer and
commentator had brought him fame, became a justice of the Court of
Common Pleas, an appointment, it is said, due to Mansfield's influence.3 s
This position he held until his death in I78o, save for four months immedi-
ately after his appointment when he sat on the King's Bench. On Febru-
ary i6th he exchanged his position with Mr. Justice Yates, who was on the
King's Bench, and who, it is said, desired to avoid Chief Justice Mans-
field.36 Bentham stated in 1828,37 that Blackstone in turn, after the death
of Yates in June, 1770, surrendered his position on the King's Bench be-
cause, being the weaker party, he was glad to slip down into the Common
tory (1813), 172-177; Goodrich, British Eloquence (1878), 148; 1 Adams, British Orations
(1884), 150.
For further discussion of parliamentary control over the colonies see Chalmers, Opinions of
Eminent Lawyers (858), 41; Goebel, Development of Legal Institutions (931), 294; i Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution (3 d ed. 1858), § i5i; 9 Holdsworth, History of English
Law (1926) 83; McIlwain, The American Revolution (1924), 1o8 n.; 2 Wilson, supra note 14,
505.
Blackstone's view that "non-conformity was a crime" was not due to Mansfield's influence.
4 B1. Comm.*5o; 4 Hammond, supra note 3, 86; An Interesting Appendix to Blackstone's
Commentaries (1772), 40, 152; Bentham, Comment on the Commentaries (Everett's ed.
1928), 24; Maitland, Constitutional History of England (1920), 516; i6 Hansard, op. cit., 319;
Goodrich, op. cit., 155; Taswell-Langmead, English Constitutional History (2d ed. i88o), 750.
34 Supra note 23.
s Zane, Five Ages of the Bench and Bar of England, i Select Essays on Anglo-American
Legal History 719. Cf. Hicks, supra note io, 132; Everett, supra note 23, 90; supra note 14.
36 The conflict in Perrin v. Blake, infra note 47, it is said, led Mr. Justice Yates to leave the
King's Bench in 1770. 4 Kent, Comm. (Lacy's ed. i889), *224 n. b; Campbell, supra note i5
332 n. 2; 8 Foss, supra note 7, 411; Letters of Junius (i8io), 2o8, aletter of Nov. 14, 177o. The
statement that Yates left the King's Bench because of dissension is discredited. See Odgers,
iizfra note 43, 548. See also infra notes 38, 49, 52.
37 x Works of Bentham 248. Bentham criticized Mansfield's egotism, his sense of superiority,
hisabsolutism, and his "judicial legislation." 6 Works of Bentham 145; 7 ibid., 311; 9 ibid., 391;
ii ibid., 62. John Marshall also commented on the "overbearing influence of Lord Mansfield"
as chief justice of the King's Bench. Livingston v. Jefferson, i Brock. 203, 15 Fed. Cas. 66o,
664 (C.C.D.Va. i8xi).
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Pleas to avoid the scornful and overpowering disposition of the Chief Jus-
tice. It is true that Blackstone, immediately after the death of Yates, re-
quested of Chief Justice Wilmot, who sat on the King's Bench from 1755
to 1766, that he again be appointed to the Court of Common Pleas and on
June 22, 177 o , he succeeded Yates. 3
When Blackstone served for four months in 1770 with Mansfield on
the King's Bench he "was always sitting in hot water" and there was
"heartburning" between the two, as Bentham asserted;39 this bad feel-
ing must have developed during that period. In the third book of the
Commentaries, published in 1768, Blackstone said of Lord Mansfield that
he was "a judge, whose masterly acquaintance with the law of nations was
known and revered by every state in Europe.' ' 40 Again in 1769, on one of
the few occasions that Blackstone appeared as a speaker in the House of
Commons, he "strenuously defended" Mansfield. 4'
In 1784 Mansfield said "we must not always rely on the words of re-
ports, though under great names: Mr. Justice Blackstone's Reports are
not very accurate." 42 It has been said that Blackstone intended to sub-
ject his notes to a necessary revision; yet in his will he directed that they
be published after his death and therefore in 178o they were printed.43 The
first edition perhaps justified Mansfield's remark, as "the reports of cases
in the first volume, which were taken by Blackstone while at the bar, are
often rough and incomplete-sometimes even ungrammatical. ' 44 Mans-
38 Yates perhaps transferred to the Common Pleas because of his physical condition. Black-
stone desired to serve on that court before he went on the King's Bench. i Jones, Blackstone
(1915), xxii; Roscoe, supra note 3, 230, 233; Douglas, supra note 3, 32. i Wendell, Blackstone
(854), xxiii, says the Court of Common Pleas "was looked upon as a retreat from active life."
39 1 Works of Bentham 248; supra note 23. Cf. infra note 54.
403 Bl. Comm.* 70. See also I Jones, Blackstone (1915), 42 n. m, for another favorable
reference to Mansfield.
41 Roscoe, supra note 3, 203; 16 Hansard, supra note 33, 542, proceedings of Feb. i, 1769,
on the expulsion of John Wilkes.
4 Hassells v. Simpson, i Doug. 89, 93 n. (2784).
43 Odgers, Blackstone, 28 Yale L. Jour. 542, 559 (1919); Clitherow, supra note 3, xxviii;
Douglas, Catalogue of Works of Blackstone (1782), 140-146. Clitherow, the editor of the
posthumous reports, was given permission by Lord Mansfield in 1780 to compare part of Black-
stone's notebooks with some official papers. Douglas, supra note 3, 104.
Odgers, op. cit., states that the first edition of Blackstone's Reports appeared in 1781. The
life of Blackstone by James Clitherow, which appears in i W. Bl. (1781), i-mxxi, is dated Feb.
20, 1781. Others state that there was a 1780 edition which was reprinted in 1781. Wallace,
The Reporters (3d ed. rev. 1855), 277; Bridgman, Legal Bibliography (18o7), ig; Clarke,
Bibliotheca Legum (1819), 349; 1 Watts, supra note x3, ii8v; Marvin, Legal Bibliography
(847), 126; Hicks, supra note io, x32. A second edition appeared in 1828.
44 Odgers, supra note 43. See also Preface, x W. Bl. (2d. ed.I828), iii-v. Veeder, The Eng-
lish Reports, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20 (19OI): "William Blackstone's miscellaneous collection of
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field's comment, however, does not necessarily reveal any ill will, for if
there had been enmity between the two, Mansfield more likely would have
been far more critical as he was seldom sparing in his remarks about the
reporters.45 Furthermore, he need not have described Blackstone, as early
as 1784, as having a great name.
46
IV
A discussion of Blackstone's career as a justice inevitably involves con-
sideration of Perrin v. Blake,47 in which Mansfield attempted to restate
the rule in Shelley's Case.45 The controversy, so virulent in nature, which
centered about the actions of Mansfield in this famous case makes it a
celebrated one in legal history49 and led to the production of an essay on
contingent remainders and executory devises5s
In the King's Bench on February 8, 1770, Chief Justice Mansfield, Mr.
Justice Yates dissenting,5' restated the historical rule in Shelley's Case
as one of construction rather than of law. On writ of error to the Ex-
chequer Chamber, Mansfield was reversed in 1772, a disposition rarely
made of his judgments..s  Mr. Justice Blackstone, not appointed to the
King's Bench until eight days after the decision in Perrin v. Blake, de-
cases (1746-79) .... does not display the care we should expect from the celebrated com-
mentator."
In Ackworth v. Kempe, i Doug. 41, 43 (1778), Mansfield said: "I have a very correct re-
port of it [Sanderson v. Baker, 3 Wils. 309 (1763) ] from Mr. Justice Blackstone's own notes
which I will read." This case contained Blackstone's opinion as a justice.
4S Wallace, supra note 43, 29, states that Mansfield, more than any other judge, commented
adversely on the reporters because his system of pulling up the landmarks of the law made it
necessary for him to discredit the old authorities; that he was more sympathetic with Pope
than Plowden, and was too independent to pursue authorities or to compare their relative
weight. For Blackstone's criticism of some reports, see i Comm. *71.
46 Erskine, as counsel in 1784, said Blackstone was a great authority. The King v. Shipley,
4 Doug. 73, 112.
4' Perrin v. Blake, 4 Burr. 2579 (1770); i Win. BI. 672.
48 Shelley's Case i Co. Rep. 9 3 b (18i).
49 Campbell, supra note 15, 329-337; Powell, Cases on Future Interests (1928), 184 n. 51;
Kales, Future Interests (1920), §§ 437,441; 24 R.C.L. 890; Van Grutten v. Foxwell [1897], App.
Cas. 658, 670.
so Feame, An Essay on Contingent Remainders (6th ed. 1So1), 238. See Hicks, Materials of
Legal Research (1923), 150.
S, Supra note 36.
s2 Zane, supra note 35, 718, states that Mansfield was reversed in only two cases. See
Douglas, supra note 3, 33 n. and 4 Kent, supra note 36, *224 n. b, to the effect that with the ex-
ception of Perrin v. Blake, supra note 47, and Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303 (1769), there was
no final difference of opinion in the court in any case or upon any point whatsoever from 1756
to 1776.
John Adams said in 1771 that the unanimity of the King's Bench from 1756, due to fear of
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livered an elaborate opinion s not in accord with Mansfield's views, which,
it has been said, was the chief factor in reversing Mansfield and on which,
it is said, his reputation as a lawyer depends even more than upon his
Commentaries. 4
John Chipman Gray has said of this case that "the reputation of'Lord
Mansfield as a commercial lawyer should not blind us to the fact that he
was not equally great in the law of real property. For instance, his deci-
sion on the rule in Shelley's Case in Perrin v. Blake .... is now universally
admitted to have been wrong."55
The decision reveals that in the law of real property Blackstone fol-
lowed the legal authorities rather than Mansfield's tendency to restate the
older doctrines on the basis of equitable principles., 6 Moreover, it shows
on the part of Blackstone, described by Bentham as "the weaker party,"
independence of judgment in a branch of law the rules of which had been
long worked out.5 7
Lord Mansfield, the Scottish chief, was a miracle in the moral and intellectual world. 4 Works
of Adams (Adams' ed. 185o), 257. See 4 Burr. 2303, 2582.
In Millar v. Taylor, Blackstone's argument as counsel for the plaintiff, that despite a
statute limiting the period of copyright, there was a perpetual common law copyright, was
followed by the King's Bench, Mr. Justice Yates dissenting. In the House of Lords in Donald-
son v. Becket, 4 Burr. 24o8, 2411 (1774), Blackstone by then a justice, expressed the views he
had set forth previously as counsel. Millar v. Taylor was not approved by the majority, how-
ever. The Commentaries in 1778 was changed to conform to the decision of 1774. I Jones,
Blackstone (i9g5), 1263 n. h. See Commons, The Legal Foundations of Capitalism (1924),
275; i Sharswood, supra note 7, xiv; Hill, Letters of Hume to Strahan (1888), 274, a letter of
1774; 7 Eng. Rul. Cas. 69; 13 C.J. 973.
s3 For Blackstone's opinion in the Exchequer Chamber see: Hargrave, Law Tracts (1787),
489-5Io; 3 Hargrave, Jurisconsult Exercitations (1813), 381; i0 Eng. Rul. Cas. 695. Cf. Van
Grutten v. Foxwell, [1897] App. Cas. 658, 676.
s4 Campbell, supra note 15, 333 n.; Hicks, supra note 10, 132. "Yet this difference of opin-
ion [in 1772] never made Lord Mansfield break out into violent sarcasms against Blackstone,
and never in any way affected the friendship that so long existed between these two great
lawTers." Odgers, supra note 43, 551 (1919). Cf. supra note 23.
5, Gray, The Rule against Perpetuities (3d ed. 1915), I69 n. 5. For a defense of Mansfield,
see Holliday, supra note 13, 190-209. See also Campbell, supra note 15, 329; Powell, supra
note 49, 184 n. 52.
56 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1923), xog; 8 Holdsworth, ibid., 45; 4 Works of
Jefferson, supra note 24; Shannon v. Bradstreet, i Sch. & Lef. 52, 66 (i8o3); Dickinson, The
Problem of the Unprovided Case, 8i Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 115, 117 (1932); Dickinson, The Law
behind the Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. 285, 311 (1929); Story, supra note 6, 300, 305; Douglas, supra
note 3, v.
57 7 Holdsworth, supra note 56, 77-78, gives the reasons why Mansfield's attempts to re-
state the law of real property failed. See also Fifoot, English Law (I932). 135; Markby, Ele-
ments of Law (4th ed. 1889), 230; 1 Evans, Decisions of Mansfield in Civil Causes (1803), 172-
356.
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V
Since Mansfield served as chief justice of the King's Bench from 1756 to
I788,58 an opportunity was furnished him to cite the Commentaries, which
appeared from 1765 to 1769. If the work were authoritative, 9 citing it
would justify an inference that Blackstone influenced Mansfield's legal
views. But since it was merely a revision of lectures given to beginning
law students it is hardly to be expected that the English courts would cite
it frequently as legal authority, at least not so soon after its publication.
Mansfield had, as has been stated, approved of the work as an introduc-
tory law text 6° and knew as did Blackstone that it was not an authorita-
tive work.6' Mansfield once cited the work, without comment other than
saying that it gave "the rise and history of amendments very shortly and
in few words. '1 62
Though the Commentaries were not considered as authoritative by
Lord Mansfield, perhaps the daring ideas of the great chief justice of the
King's Bench influenced Blackstone, the university professor. As stated,
Book One had been critically read by Mansfield after its publication
and errors in it pointed out to Blackstone. 3 Mr. Justice Wilmot sug-
gested a revision of this book and Blackstone sought a meeting with him
s8 Willis, supra note 5, 154.
59 Jenks, History of English Law (2d ed. 1922), 196; 1 Kent, Comm. *499; Pollock, Juris-
prudence (5th ed. 1923), 250.
6o Supra note 21.
6z i Bl. Comm. *72. Lord Chancellor Redesdale in Shannon v. Shannon, i Sch. & Lef. 324,
327 (18o4), said: "I am always sorry to hear Mr. justice Blackstone's Commentaries cited as
an authority: he would have been sorry himself to hear the book so cited: he did not consider
it such." Cf. 2 Great American Lawyers (r9o8), 498 n. ii.
Blackstone described himself an "academical expounder." i Comm. *35. See also Black-
stone, Law Tracts (17.7I), vii; Jones, Bailments (781), 3; Hoffman, Course of Legal Study
(1817), 90; 20 Howell, State Trials, 797.
62 Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2526, 2527 (1770). See 3 Bl. Comm. *407 for the passage cited.
In Atcheson v. Everitt, i Cowp. 382, 387 (1775), counsel cited "3 B1. Comm. 158." Lord
Mansfield, in the opinion, said: "Mr. Justice Blackstone, and all modem and ancient writers
upon the subject distinguish between them [penal statutes and criminal laws.]" i Cowp. at
391. Blackstone's work was cited by counsel before Mansfield in Smith v. Mapleback, i T.R.
441, 445 (1786) and Johnstone v. Sutton, i T.R . 4 93 , 5i8 (1785). See also The King v. Shipley,
4 Doug. 73, iii, 172 (1784) and Jones v. Smart, i T.R. 44, 49 (1785).
Douglas, supra note 3, log, states that the Commentaries "are permitted to be cited though
not graced with an allocatur, even in the superior courts at Westminster." On the system of
judicial licensing of reports see Hicks, supra note 5o, 102; Douglas, supra note 3, io6 n.; Jenks,
supra note 59, 19o; Preface, i Burr. Rep. (1765), vii.
63 Supra note ig.
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to discuss proposed changes.64 In May, 1766, the manuscript of Book
Two, or the first part of it, was submitted to him with the suggestion that
he mark in the margin errors of the grosser kind.6 5
From this one may infer that the academic Blackstone was not disdain-
ful of the critical comments of the justices. Yet one would hardly expect
that Mansfield, with his alleged lack of respect for the common law" could
influence Blackstone, the exemplar of legal conservatism, the faithful de-
fender and recorder of the common law, and the uncritical worshipper of
legal institutions. 7 Surely in a work which was an introductory text,
Blackstone would not follow legal innovations of recent origin, even
though instituted by his friend and patron. As he said in Book One, a
judge is sworn to maintain and expound the old law by following prece-
dents and not to pronounce new law according to his private sentiments.68
What were the legal innovations of Mansfield, which Blackstone could
incorporate into his work, if he had desired to do so? Mansfield's work, as
described by Holdsworth, consisted in reducing the law merchant to a
body of settled principles, in liberalizing the law of quasi-contract, and in
attempting to recast the doctrine of consideration and to make the court
of King's Bench a court of equity as well as a court of law. He said that
being a Scotchman, Mansfield kept up his interest in Scotch law which
tended to make him learned in Roman and continental law and therefore
to approach the common law from the view point of a student of the broad
principles of jurisprudence and not of English legal history. This led him
to attempt to restate much of the common law in terms of equitable prin-
ciples by reliance on foreign analogies and natural reason or justice, rather
than by following precedents which were suitable for a feudal or agricul-
tural society but ill-adapted to the needs of a commercial nation. 69
64 Fox, Contempt of Court (1927), 21, states that Blackstone's passage on attachment for
contempt probably can be traced to the undelivered opinion of Mr. Justice Wilmot, when on
the King's Bench, in a case of libel of Mansfield. Rex v. Almon, Wilm. 243 (1765); 4 B1. Comm.
*283-*288. The statement rests, in part, on the fact that Blackstone submitted portions of
his work to Wilmot for comment. Supra note 19.
65 Ibid. Cf. Roscoe, supra note 3, 248.
64 Works of Jefferson, supra note 24; 13 Writings of Jefferson (Mem. ed. 1905), i66;
Junius, supra note 36; 3 Campbell, supra note iS, 337; 2 Story, supra note 26, 2o; Waterman,
supra note 24, 644.
67 Dillon, supra note 7, 297; Holdsworth, Sources and Literature of English Law (1925),
x56.
66 1 Bl. Comm. *69; i Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (19o6), 498 n. 8.
6 8 Holdsworth, supra note 56, 44-45; 3 Holdsworth, supra note 56, xo9; Zane, supra note
35, 717; Story, stupra note 6, 305, 412; Plucknett, History of the Common Law (1929), 170;
Pound, sutpra note ii, 67.
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Yet Holdsworth states that the Commentaries adopted the reasoning
and results of the decisions of Lord Mansfield on commercial law, consid-
eration, and equity.70 He reached this conclusion after comparing the
manuscript of Blackstone's lectures at Oxford, delivered before Mansfield
became chief justice, with the Commentaries, which were published about
nine years after Mansfield began his legal innovations. Since the treat-
ment of these topics in the Commentaries differs from that in the earlier
lectures but is in accord with the decisions of Mansfield rendered after
the lectures were prepared, Holdsworth concludes that the changes were
due to the influence of those decisions.
VI
Holdsworth states that Blackstone's treatment of equity jurisprudence
in the Commentaries as contrasted to those in the earlier lectures, does
little more than reproduce in a connected and literary form the views ex-
pressed by Lord Mansfield in his decisions.7 Hammond repeats a state-
ment that the chapter on "proceedings in equity" 72 has been said to be
the work of Lord Mansfield. 73 This statement, however, is not accepted
by Hammond, who says that "the style and method seem to be the same
with the rest of the book."4 Hammond summarizes his view of Mans-
field's influence on Blackstone's chapter on proceedings in equity in these
words:
It is no doubt the object of the entire chapter to reduce all the differences between
law and equity, so far as possible, to matter of mere procedure, and forward the blend-
ing of the two. Lord Mansfield was doing all he could in the courts of law to forward
the same object by means of actions on the case; the equitable nature of which in the
Roman sense of the term he was civilian enough to see and appreciate ..... 75
Blackstone considered the division of the English law into two systems,
one of law and the other of equity; an artificial one, a separation not to be
70o Holdsworth, Blackstone's Treatment of Equity, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 1o (1930).
7" Ibid., 7, 11, 28.
72 3 BI. Comm. C. 27.
73 3 Hammond, supra note 3, 6o4. i Warren, Law Studies (3 d ed. 1863), 657 n. i, states
that somewhere he had read the surmise that Mansfield had written that part of 3 Bl. Comm.
on equity from pages 429 to 443. The first edition of this work in 1835 it seems omits this
statement. The writer was unable to secure the second edition of this book.
2 Jones, Blackstone (x915), 2043 n. i states that Blackstone, having been engaged in com-
mon law and not chancery practise, "doubtless did not consider himself properly equipped by
his studies or previous experience to write a pioneer treatise upon the system of equity." His
treatment therefore was merely "a general sketch." For the influence of Mansfield's chancery
practise upon his legal decisions, see Turner, Equity of Redemption (5931), 94; 2 Yorke, Life of
Hardwicke (1913), 513; Holdsworth, supra note 70, 8. See also Billson, Equity in Relation to
Common Law (1917), 5-IQ; 2 Austin, supra note 28, §§ 889,1029; Maitland, Equity (1913), 12.
74 3 Hammond, supra note 3, 604. 79Ibid.
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found in any other country in the universe. 6 He did not believe, as did
Lord Kames77 whose statements he was refuting, that itwas the business
of a court of equity to abate the rigor and harshness of the common law
nor did he believe that the common law courts were characterized by
harsh and illiberal principles35 It was his belief that the courts of equity
would not have been needed had the clerks of chancery and the common
law judges been more liberal in interpreting the Statute of Westminster II
by adapting the writ to the reason and equity of the suitor's case.7 9
This attempt of Mansfield to convert courts of law into courts of equity,
in part by the use of the action of assumpsit, 8° did not pass unnoticed at
the time but led to many bitter attacks on him."' And Blackstone,
usually considered an opponent of legal reform, appears in a new light,
for Jefferson said of Mansfield's legal innovations that they were "admira-
bly seconded by the celebrated Dr. Blackstone. '18
2
VII
Turning from Blackstone's treatment of equity jurisprudence which it
seems was a summary of Mansfield's views, consider the treatment in the
Commentaries of quasi-contract and the introduction of equitable prin-
ciples into law by the use of the action of money had and received.8 3 If
" 3 B1. Comm. *434, *442.
77 Henry Home, Lord Kames, a Scotsman, published "Principles of Equity" in August,
1766, which he dedicated to Mansfield. See 2 Jones, Blackstone (1915), 2o67 n.; 3 BI. Comm.
*49 n. e. i Tytler, Life and Writings of Kames (1807), 250-257, replies to Blackstone's "cen-
sure" of the views of Kames. i Story, Equity Jurisprudence (13 th ed. x886), 13 disagrees with
the views of Kames on equity. See also 8 Writings of Jefferson (Mem. ed. i9o5) 384; 10 Ameri-
can Jurist 227 (1833).
78 3 Bl. Comm. *430. See Chief Justice Wilmot's remarks in 1767 in Collins v. Blantem,
2 Wils. 341, 350 (1767).
793 B1. Comm. *5i. See Ames, Lectures on Legal History (913), 443; Plucknett, Case and
the Statute of Westminster I, 31 Col. L. Rev. 778, 780 (193); Fisher, The Administration of
Equity through Common Law Forms, 2 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 8io,
822; Keigwin, Cases in Common Law Actions (1928), 132 n.
So Hohfeld, The Relations between Equity and Law, ix Mich. L. Rev. 537, 562 (1913).
8' 2 Yorke, Life of Hardwicke (1913), 512; Junius, supra note 36; Yarborough, John Home
Tooke (1926), 86; 4 Works of Jefferson, supra note 24; 2 Story, supra note 26; Douglas, supra
note 3, 121. For a defense of Mansfield's efforts to turn courts of law into courts of equity see
2 Evans, Decisions of Mansfield in Civil Causes (803), 404; 3 Campbell, supra note r5, 338.
8' 4 Works of Jefferson, supra note 24.
83 Mansfield by fostering the action of assumpsit introduced equitable principles into the
law, liberalized legal doctrines, and encroached upon equity; acts, in large part, done through
the development of the law of quasi-contract. Hohfeld, supra note 8o, 562.
Sadler v. Evans, 4 Burr. 1984, i986 (1766) reads: "It [the action of money had and re-
ceived] is a liberal action founded upon large principles of equity. The defence is any equity
that will rebut the action."
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any English judge ever used the action of assumpsit as an instrument of
legal reform it was Mansfield,8 4 and since he began this just prior to the
publication of the Commentaries, it seems a sound inference that Black-
stone's glowing tributes to this legal panacea s can be traced to Mansfield's
decisions.
Blackstone said of actions on the case, that where the subject matter is
such as requires a determination secundum aequum et bonum the judg-
ments of law courts are guided by the most liberal "equity" 6 and that
when the suit is upon an implied contract for money received to another's
use, it is almost as universally remedial as a bill in equity.8 7 In the last
chapter in Book Four, writing of the progress of the law, Blackstone com-
mented on the liberality of sentiment, though late, which has taken pos-
session of the courts of common law and induced them to adopt the prin-
ciples of redress of our courts of equity principally by extending the reme-
dial influence of the equitable writ of trespass on the case.8" These state-
ments were published from 1765 to 1769.
Lord Mansfield said in Moses v. MacFerlan, decided in 176o,89 that the
action for money had and received was an equitable one, which is very
beneficial and which ought to be encouraged, and that the gist of the ac-
tion is that the defendant is obliged by the ties of natural justice and
equity to refund the money. In another case in 1762, Mansfield said that
he had often observed that an action upon the case is almost equivalent
to a bill in equity and that whatever appears upon the trial that takes
away the equity will take away the remedy.90
Mansfield is generally credited with formulating the modern law of
quasi-contract.9' Since this doctrine was borrowed from the Roman law,92
84 "Finally, under the influence of Lord Mansfield, the action was so much encouraged that
it became almost the universal remedy where a defendant had received money which he was
'obliged by natural justice and equity to refund.' " Ames, supra note 79, x64.
s Mr. justice Iredell in Georgia v. Braflsford, 2 Dall. 415, 417 (1793) described the action of
money had and received as the legal panacea of modem times.
86 3 BI. Comm. *436. 87 Ibid., *432. 88 4 BI. Comm. *442.
89 Moses v. MacFerlan 2 Burr. iooS, 1012. See i W.B1. 219 for the same case. For a dis-
cussion of the case see 3 Cook, Cases on Equity (1924), 926 n. 2; 2 Warren, supra note 73,
1352 n. 2.
For the analogy of trusts to quasi-contract see 2 Fonblanque, Equity (3 d ed. 1807), 4 n. b;
2 Story, supranote 77, § 1255; Andrews, American Law (2d ed. i9o8), 1112, 1266; 3 Bl. Comm.
*432.
90 Bird v. Randall, 3 Burr. 1345, i W.BI. 387 (1762).
91 8 Holdsworth, supra note 56, 96-97; Woodward, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (1913), 2;
Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 3 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, 297;
Walsh, History of Anglo-American Law (2d ed. 1932), 349.
9, Woodward, supra note 91, 3. Radin, Roman Law (1927), 300, cites the Roman law
source from which Mansfield quoted in Moses v. MacFerlan. See 2 B1. Comm. *443 n. g,
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it has been thought that Mansfield's views can be traced to his knowledge
of that body of law and that this in turn was due to his interest in Scotch
law.93 But it must be remembered that Blackstone was perhaps also
versed in Roman law as he desired to become a professor in that subject at
Oxford94 It may also be argued that the concepts of natural justice and
reason were so much a part of the eighteenth century legal philosophy
that it is unwarranted to assume that Blackstone's view on quasi-con-
tract is traceable toMansfield.95
Yet Blackstone's treatment of quasi-contract seems to reveal the in-
fluence of Mansfield,96 though it has been pointed out that he was confused
for a reference to the Institutes of Justinian in the discussion of quasi-contract. "An example
of Lord Mansfield's use of the Civil law will be seen in his exposition of the nature of the equita-
ble action for money had and received, which can be traced passage by passage, to the Corpus
Juris ...." Scrutton, The Influence of the Roman Law (I885), i8i. See also Corbin, Quasi-
Contractual Obligations, 21 Yale L. Jour. 533, 545 (i912); Scott, Cases on Quasi-Contracts
(19o5), c. 1; 2 Pothier, Law of Obligations (Evans' ed. 1826), app., 326-331.
93 7 Holdsworth, supra note 56, 44; Plucknett, supra note 6, 169. See Adam Smith, Lec-
tures on Justice (Cannan's ed. 1896), 134, where this distinguished Scotsman about 1763 used
the term "quasi-contract." "It must be allowed that the introduction of quasi-contract was
the highest stretch of equity, and except in the Roman law it was never perfected nor intro-
duced." Ibid., 267. Cf. Boson v. Sandford, 3 Mod. 321, 323 (16go).
"Lord Mansfield had on his mind prejudices derived from his familiarity with the Scotch
law, where law and equity are administered in the same court ... ." Shannon v. Bradstreet,
I Sch. & Lef. 52, 66 (i8o3).
For the influence of Mansfield's Scottish background on his attempts to convert courts of
law into courts of equity, see: 2 Story, supra note 26; 3 Campbell, supra note iS, 338; 12 Jef-
ferson, supra note 77; 429; Letters of Junius (i8io), 2o6; Pollock, The Genius of the Common
Law (1912), 83-84; Douglas, supra note 3, 33; 2 Street, supra note 68, 141; Seccombe, supra
note i, 229. Some writers state that Mansfield's Scotch education influenced his views on the
common law. Scrutton, Mercantile Law (i8gi), i5; Andrews, Jurisprudence and Legal Insti-
tutions (1913), 359; Vance, The Early History of Insurance, 3 Select Essays in Anglo-American
Legal History, 116. Mansfield attended Westminster School, London, when fourteen and later
studied at Oxford and resided in Lincoln's Inn. Campbell, supra note 15, 207-219. Dr. John-
son said of Mansfield's education: "Much may be made of a Scotchman, if he be caught
young." Boswell, supra note 12, 425.
94 Supra note 16. Blackstone recommended the study of Roman law. See I B1. Comm. *33,
which reads: .... if lastly, he has contemplated those maxims reduced to a practical system
in the laws of imperial Rome."
95 Dickinson, supra note 56, i 17 n. 2; Wright, The Natural Law in American Political The-
ory, 4 S. W. Pol. Sci. Quar. 202, 204 (1923); Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence
(i9oi), 6ox; Pollock, The Law of Reason, 2 Mich. L. Rev. i59, 163 (19o3); Ehrlich, Judicial
Freedom of Decision, Science of Legal Method (1921), 47, 67; 3 Bl. Comm. *161.
96 "Lord Mansfield seems to have been the first fully to appreciate the marvelous flexibility
of the count for money had and received . . . ." 3 Street, supra note 68, 192. "Blackstone,
following Lord Mansfield's creative example as a faithful expositor .... "Pollock, History of
the Law of Nature, 2 Col. L. Rev. 131, 136 (1902). "The action for money had and received,
which Lord Mansfield had made into a bill in equity at law .... "Pound, Law and Morals
(1923), 37. See also 2 Evans, supra note 8i, 200.
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in the second book of the Commentaries as to the distinction between con-
tracts implied in law and those implied in fact.97 It is to be noted that
Blackstone quotes almost verbatim from Moses v. MacFerlan to which he
refers in the footnotes, 98 in his discussion of the action of money had and
received in the third book of the Commentaries. Thus within eight years
after this case was decided, which Holdsworth says summed up the law of
quasi-contract and gave precision to it, its language was incorporated by
Blackstone in his work.99 While Blackstone has been considered as merely
recording with praise the orthodox law, in this instance he again accepted
without critical comment another of Mansfield's legal innovations.
VIII
From a consideration of Mansfield's use of the action of assumpsit,'and
more particularly the count of money had and received, one turns to the
incorporation of the law merchant into the common law. °° In dealing with
mercantile cases Mansfield once again utilized the action of assumpsit and
the principle of judicial freedom of decision to accomplish his purpose.-°7
Pollock has said:
When the action.of Assumpsit had enlarged not only procedure but ideas, mer-
cantile causes could be brought before the court on the footing, not that the parties
were persons subject to the law merchant, but that they had agreed to be bound by the
97 Keeuer, Quasi-Contracts (i893), 7-8; 2 Bl. Comm. *443.
98 3 B1. Comm. *162. A footnote by Blackstone on this page cites 4 Burr. 1012, without
giving the name of the case. The reference is no doubt to Moses v. MacFerlan, 2 Burr. 0oo0,
1012. Volumes one and two of Burrow's Reports were first published in four parts. Later the
other three volumes by Burrow appeared. See Bridgman, supra note 43, 47; Clarke, supra note
43, 352. This case first appeared in part four, which explains why Blackstone cited it as 4 Burr.
instead of 2 Burr. Moses v. MacFerlan also appears in I W.Bl. 2X9, 221. But the paragraph of
the case quoted in the Commentaries differs from that in Blackstone's own report of the case.
2 Comm., c. 30, in which Blackstone discusses contracts, is headed "title by contract" and be-
gins with the statement that it includes "title by contract to property in things personal."
For comment see Barbour, The History of Contract in Early English Equity, 4 Oxford Studies
in Social and Legal History (1914), 43.
99 8 Holdsworth, supra note 56, 97.
Ioo Scrutton, supra note 93, 14.
10, Andrews, Jurisprudence and Legal Institutions (913), 352, 359, reads, "It is under the
action of assumpsit that the modem law merchant has been incorporated into the common
law ..... Lord Mansfield treating the action of assumpsit as we have just seen as an equita-
ble action, freely and without concealment drew from the rich storehouse of the civil law for
his principles of equity and justice, and it may be as plainly and truthfully stated that by this
invocation of the civil law as it had developed in Europe at his time, he transformed the crude
code of the common law into something like the elegance of a modern system." The relation
between the law merchant and assumpsit is discussed in i Spence, Equity jurisdiction (1846),
*247. Courts of law in cases involving commercial and maritime law adopt the most enlarged
and liberal principles and proceed upon the same doctrines as courts of equity. 1 Story, supra
note 77, 31. See also Ewart, The Law Merchant, 3 Col. L. Rev. 135, 149 (7903).
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custom of merchants. In this sense it could be said in the seventeenth, century that the
law merchant was part of the Common Law. Blackstone had no difficulty in adopting
this statement, writing just before Mansfield's work began."°2
From this one can infer that Blackstone's treatment of the law mer-
chant was not influenced by Mansfield's incorporation of it into the com-
mon law. But Mansfield ascended the bench in 1756, some nine years be-
fore Blackstone had completed the first book, and had already rendered
his decisions in Miller v. Race0 3 and Grant v. Vaughan,104 leading cases
in the law of bills and notes. In Luke v. Lyde, which involved a point of
admiralty law, Mansfield in 1759 had said "the maritime law is not the
law of a particular country, but the general law of nations.,s Unless
Mansfield's work in incorporating the law merchant into the common law
came after 1765, nine years after he became chief justice, it cannot be
seen how Blackstone wrote just before Mansfield's work began.
Holdsworth has stated that Blackstone in his treatment of commercial
law accepted the reasoning and results of Lord Mansfield and again sup-
ports this observation by comparing the manuscript of the earlier lectures
with the Commentaries. °6 Hammond also points out that in the first
edition of Book One, Blackstone, in speaking of the law merchant, says
that the law of England leaves the causes of merchants to be tried by their
own peculiar customs but that the second edition states that the law
merchant is held to be a part of the law of England, which decides the
causes of merchants by the general rules which obtain in all commercial
countries. 0 7
XO2 Pollock, supra note 93, 82. Infra note 107.
1o3 Miller v. Race, i Burr. 452 (1758). The action in this case was trover. "This [trover] is
an equitable action .... [the plaintiff] must therefore come with clean hands; according to
the principle, that those who seek equity must do equity." Lord Mansfield in Fitzroy v.
Gwillim, 1 T.R. 153, 154 (T786).
104 Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 15x6 (1764). -This case is referred to in 2 BI. Comm. *469
merely by name. It appears in i W.Bl. 485. See supra notes 43, 98.
"S 2 Burr. 882, 887; x W.Bl. 19o. Scrutton, supra note 93, 6 in citing this statement of
Mansfield says it was made "later than Blackstone." The decision was rendered in 1759, while
the first book of the Commentaries was not published until 1765.
106 Holdsworth, supra note 70, i n. 45. See also Holdsworth, Blackstone, 4 Camb. L. Jour.
261, 271 (1932).
X07 1 Hammond, supra note 3, *273 n. Cf. I Comm. *75, where Blackstone also states that
the law merchant, though a part of the common law and allowed in all commercial transactions,
is used only among one set of the king's subjects. Pollock, supra note 59, 287, states that at the
time Blackstone was finishing his Commentaries, the process of adopting the customs of
merchants into the general law was being accomplished. Edie v. East India Co., I W.Bl. 295
(1761), is cited to show that Mansfield held that when once a point of mercantile law was
settled no particular usage should be admitted to contradict it. See Burdick, The Law Mer-
chant, 2 Col. L. Rev. 470, 481 (1902), where it is stated that frequently the verdicts of mercan-
tile juries were set aside by Mansfield. See also 2 Street, supra note 68, 397; Potter, Historical
Introduction to English Law (x932), 291.
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Pollock has said that since Mansfield was Scotch by birth he followed
the Scottish tradition of cosmopolitan jurisprudence rather than the in-
sular learning of the Inns of Court. °s Blackstone accepted this attitude
as he said: "in mercantile transactions they [the courts] follow the marine
law, and argue from the usages and authorities received in all maritime
countries. ' 'I °9 Later he said that in mercantile questions, such as bills of
exchange, and in all marine causes, the law merchant, which is a branch of
the law of nations, is adhered to constantly. °0
Blackstone apparently was referring to Mansfield, when, at the end of
Book Four, he spoke of the great system of marine jurisprudence, the foun-
dations of which have been laid of late by the development of the princi-
ples of insurance law."' Since Mansfield is considered as having first
formulated the principles of the law of insurance, there being but sixty re-
ported cases before his day,' it seems fair to assume that Blackstone was
referring to Mansfield when he said that learning on marine insurance has
of late been greatly improved by a series of judicial decisions which have
now established the law in such a variety of cases that if judiciously col-
lected they would form a complete title in a code of commercial juris-
prudence." 3
And in commenting on the transfer of an order instrument by indorse-
ment or a bearer one by delivery, he defends the right of the holder to re-
cover from the maker, "contrary to the general rule of the common law
that no chose in action is assignable," by the economic argument that as-
signment is the life of paper credit." 4 And in support of the right of the
108 Pollock,.supra note 93, 84. Cf. Blackstone's description of the influence on decisions in
late years of the general spirit of laws and the principles of universal jurisprudence, which ap-
peared in the preface to Book One in 1765. In Cornu v. Blackburne, 2 Doug. 641, 648 (178),
Lord Mansfield said, "Learned lawyers were written to on that occasion [Ricord v. Bettenham,
3 Burr. 1734, 1741 (1765)], both in France and Holland, and Mr. Justice Blackstone shewed
me several letters he had received from abroad on the subject."
109 3 Hammond, supra note 3, *436 n. For the relation between the law merchant and
marine jurisprudence, see Andrews, supra note Ioi, 361; Pound and Plucknett, Readings on
the Common Law, 221-223.
... 4 B1. Comm. *67. See Scott, The Legal Nature of International Law, 5 Col. L. Rev. 124,
126 (1905) and supra note 107.
... 4 B1. Comm. *442.
1 Park, Law of Marine Insurances (789), xl; Vance, The Early History of Insurance,
3 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, ii5-i16; Story, supra note 6, 298.
ir3 2 Bl. Comm. *460. See Park, supra note 112, vi.
114 2 B1. Comm. *468. Blackstone in writing of the recent progress of the laws of England
stated, "..... the introduction and establishment of paper credit, by indorsements upon bills
aid notes, which have shown the legal possibility and convenience (which our ancestors so long
doubted) of assigning a chose in action." 4 B1. Comm. *442. See also 2 ibid., *463.
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holder of a bearer note to recover from the maker, Blackstone cites as
authority the case of Grant v. Vaughan, decided by Mansfield in 1764 just
two years before Book Two appeared."15 Perhaps Blackstone's treatment
of the law merchant was meager but this is to be expected in an introduc-
tory law text written about 1766. Yet the Commentaries showed an un-
derstanding of the efforts of Mansfield to develop a code of marine juris-
prudence based on the law of nations.
IX
In the field of contracts Mansfield attempted to recast the doctrine of
consideration along the lines of the civil law"6 by disregarding the pro-
cedural origin of consideration and by introducing principles not in accord
with the older law." 7
In 1765 in Pillans v. Van Mierop"8 Mansfield threw out the revolution-
ary suggestion that agreements should be enforceable if in writing, that
the ancient notion about consideration was for the sake of evidence only,
and that the want of consideration is not an objection in commercial
cases."19 Street has said this remark of Mansfield, delivered about a year
before Book Two was published, made an impression on Blackstone. 20 In
discussing consideration, Blackstone said the rule as to consideration was
established because of the inconveniences arising from suits on verbal
promises, for which no good reason could be assigned; therefore the rule
does not hold where the promise is proved by written documents and that
bonds and notes carry with them "an internal evidence of a good consider-
ation.' 2' Holdsworth states that this view of Blackstone likewise does
not appear in the lectures delivered prior to the decision of Pillans v. Van
_4 ierop."'
"S 2 Bl. Comm. *469.
1'6 Pollock, Contract (3d Amer. ed. igo6), *18o, says if Mansfield's views on consideration
had been adopted the English law of contract would have been like that of modern civil law
as adopted by the law of Scotland. Cf. 2 Street, supra note 68, 142.
217 8 Holdsworth, supra note 56, 34 n. 1. See also Costigan, Cases on Contracts (2d ed.
1932), 193 n. 4. The doctrine of implied conditions, resting on equitable principles, emerged in
Mansfield's opinion in Kingston v. Preston, 2 Doug. 689 (773), four years after the last book
of the Commentaries had been published. See Costigan, The Performance of Contracts (2d
ed. 1927), io, 34, 50.
1S 3 Burr. 1663 (1765). The doctrine that a bill or note requires consideration "was un-
known in the time of Blackstone (2 Comm. 446)." Lorenzen, Conflict of Laws Relating to Bills
and Notes (I919), 28 n. 71, quoting from Huffcutt, The Law of Negotiable Instruments (2d
ed. 1913), 325.
"19 8 Holdsworth, supra note 56, 29, 47. Anson, Contract (5th ed. Corbin 1930), 125.
120 2 Street, supra note 68, 142 n. 4.
22 2 Bl. Comm. *445-*446. Holdsworth, supra note 70, iI n. 46.
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In discussing the action of assumpsit in a later book, Blackstone makes
no reference to consideration, bt says that a promise is in the nature of a
verbal covenant and wants nothing but the solemnity of writing and seal-
ing to make it the sameY.2 3 Hammond states that the failure to refer to
consideration- as an essential element of an actionable promise can only
be understood by recalling Pillans v. Van Mierop. 4 It seems clear then
that Blackstone was influenced by Mansfield's attempt to recast the doc-
trine of consideration and adopted his evidentiary view within a few
years after its appearance 2 _
CONCLUSION
One writer has said that Blackstone's work was published just when
Mansfield was adding an entire new area to the English common law.
i 6
Another has said that at the very time Blackstone was defending English
law two great reformers were at work, Mansfield, by use of judicial legisla-
tion, and Bentham, who recommended legislative reforms."' 7 And still a
third writer has said that Blackstone caught the spirit of his time, but
just in time, as Bentham soon sounded a rude blast which disturbed the
23 3 Bl. Comm. *r58. See Pollock, supra note 93, 69; Barbour, supra note 98, 162.
14 3 Hammond, supra note 3, *157 n. For Wilmot's observations in Pillans v. Van Mierop
on naudun pactum see 2 Street, supra note 68, 141; Cooper, Institutes of Justinian (3 d ed.
1852), 588; i Evans, supra note 81, 423.
15 On "moral obligation" in relation to "the natural justice" doctrine of quasi-contract,
see Buller, Nisi Prius (i8o6), 130; Anson, supra note ii9, 596; Holdsworth, Debt, Assumpsit,
and Consideration, ii Mich. L. Rev. 347, 356 (913); Cooper, supra note 124, 585, 589;
8 Holdsworth, supra note 56, 27. In 4 Ency. of Social Sciences (1931), 233, 234, it is said that
Blackstone accepted Mansfield's views on "moral obligation." Blackstone wrote, "..... even
if the thing be founded on a prior moral obligation (as a promise to pay a just debt, though
barred by the statute of limitations), it is no longer nudum parum." 2 Comm. *445. Lorenzen,
Causa and Consideration, 28 Yale L. Jour. 621, 638 (i919), states that the doctrine of moral
obligation originated in Mansfield's opinion in Hawkes v. Saunders, I Cowp. 289 (1782).
Bentham, Comment on the Commentaries (Everett's ed. 1928), 24, editor's introd., intimates
that the doctrine first appeared in Atkins v. Hill, i Cowp. 284 (i775). These ases were de-
cided after the Commentaries was published. In i Esp. N.P. (3d ed. 1798), *95, the unre-
ported case of Scott v. Nelson, decided by Mansfield in 1764, is cited in support of the doctrine
of moral obligation.
Blackstone, in his illustration, could easily have relied on the older doctrine that "the debt
was considered to be a sufficient consideration for the subsequent promise," but instead be re-
lied on the doctrine of "moral obligation." See 8 Holdsworth, supra note 56, 26; 2 Street,
supra note 68, i43; Willis, Consideration in Anglo-American Law, 72 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 245,
252 (1924). Cf. note to 3 Bos. & Pul. 247, 249 (x802); Langdell, Summary of the Law of Con-
tracts (iH88o), 89; Smith, supra note 93, 132; 1 Williston, Contracts (192o), 327.
-6 Reed, The Public Profession of the Law (1921), 347.
' Zane, supra note 35, 716. See supra note 37 for Bentham's attack on Mansfield's judi-
cial legislation. See also Dicey, supra note io, 166; Bentham, supra note 125, 24.
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supposed finality of the common lawY.12 From these statements one may
infer that Blackstone, when preparing the Commentaries, was not aware
of Mansfield's work in the courts in London, or perhaps the nature of it,
even though the two from 1753, if not before, had been closely associ-
ated.12
9
It would not be strange if the Commentaries failed to record the re-
forms of Mansfield, for his work as chief justice of the King's Bench, which
began in 1756, continued for twenty years after the Commentaries was
published. And if Blackstone was an idolator of the past, an orthodox
legalist, and an enemy of legal reform, 30 surely he would not have been in-
fluenced by these revolutionary decisions of Mansfield, which were not
yet rendered when he began to lecture in 1753. Assuredly the legal innova-
tions of Mansfield, a jurist who sought to develop a cosmopolitan juris-
prudence based on equitable principles and foreign analogies and who was
disdainful of the ancient forms and of the authorities, would not impress
one of Blackstone's legal temperament nor be included in a law text a few
years after their appearance. It would seem that Blackstone, a typical
legal conservative, though a prot6g6 of Mansfield, would ignore these
products of judicial radicalism.131
Yet daring as these innovations were, Blackstone, the supposed de-
fender of all accepted legal tradition, almost immediately upon their ap-
pearance and even after he had prepared his original lectures, incorporated
them into his Commentaries. True, the references to them do not describe
them as innovations, nor do they change the uncritical attitude of the
work. Yet Blackstone was aware of the code of marine jurisprudence
which Mansfield was building up; he favored the introduction of equitable
129 Pollock, The Law of England, 3 L. Quar. Rev. 343, 344 (1887). Bentham attended
Blackstone's lectures in 1763, when fifteen. The Commentaries was completed in 1769, seven
years before Bentham's first published work appeared. Bentham, Fragment on Government
(Montague's ed. 8gi), 5, editor's introd.
129 If the friendship between Blackstone and Mansfield did terminate, it seems that this
happened after 1769, by which time the fourth book of the Commentaries had been completed.
See supra note 54.
130 Bentham, The Theory of Legislation (1931), 69, states that Blackstone was the enemy of
every legal reform. Cf. Holdsworth, supra note 67, 159, which states that Blackstone intro-
duced reforms in legal education. Accord: Thayer, Legal Essays (1907), 367; 1 Jones, Black-
stone (x925), =xix; Plucknett, supra note 69, 2o6. Blackstone was also interested in prison re-
form. See Everett, supra note 23, 112; Roscoe, supra note 3, 252; Odgers, supra note 43, 554.
See Holdsworth, Lessons from Legal History (1928), 98 n. i and Holdsworth, Historians of
Anglo-American Law (1927), 57 for Blackstone's critical attitude toward many legal princi-
ples. Cf. Blackstone's views on legal education. " .... sciences are of a sociable disposition,
and flourish best in the neighborhood of each other; nor is there any branch of learning, but
may be helped and improved by assistances from other arts." i Bl. Comm. *34.
'31 1 Wilson, supra note x4, 19 n. 2; Dillon, supra note 7, 299.
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principles into the law; he was not averse to turning courts of law into
courts of equity; he considered the distinction between law and equity an
arbitrary one; he quoted the doctrine of Mansfield's leading case in quasi-
contract almost verbatim; he stated that the action of money had and re-
ceived could b& used as a bill in equity; and he followed Mansfield's sug-
gestion that consideration was merely evidentiary and that commercial
agreements in writing did not require consideration.
If Blackstone's incorporation of Mansfield's innovations into an other-
wise orthodox text be regarded as inconsistent, 32 a similar charge of in-
consistency can be made against Mansfield. Mansfield defended the
English colonial policy, .33 which was a mercantilist one 3 4 and such as
tended to foster a national economy. 35 While Mansfield's legal opinions
were an expression of a cosmopolitan jurisprudence 36 which drew its prin-
ciples from the law of nations and of marine jurisprudence, he was not in-
fluenced by the developing cosmopolitan economics which Adam Smith,
the Scotchman, was to summarize in The Wealth of Nations in I776. 37
132 See 2 Ency. of Social Sciences (1931), 58o-58r, for a discussion of Blackstone's incon-
sistent legal and political philosophy. See also Corwin, The Higher Law Background of Ameri-
can Constitutional Law, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 365, 4o5 (1929); Dunning, Political Theories from
Rousseau to Spencer (1920), 75.
'33 Holliday, supra note 13, 246. For praise of the mercantile system see i Bl. Comm. *274;
for a discussion of regalian rights, ibid., *241; for a defense of the navigation acts, ibid., *4x8;
for statements on the evils of a tariff, ibid., *317. See also Haney, History of Economic
Thought (1912), 127, n. i. For discussion of other economic views in the Commentaries see:
Bentham, A Defence of Usury (2d ed. 1842), 6o; Hazlitt, The Spirit of the Age (4 th ed. 1894),
197; Sedgwick, Remarks on the Commentaries (18o), 173-224; Matsushita, Economic Effects
of Public Debts (1929), 20.
134 Birney, Economic History of Europe (2d ed. i93i), 69; Williamson, A History of British
Expansion (1927), 456; Schmoller, Mercantile System (1913), 79; Horrocks, Mercantilism
(1925), 88; Gide and Rist, History of Economic Doctrines (2d ed. z915), 1o3; Haney, supra
note 133, io8.
X3 Haney, supra note 133, 97. See 2 Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Oxford ed. 19o4), x84-
185.
136 io Halsbury, Laws of England, 259; supra note io8.
X37 For a discussion of mercantile or national economy, as contrasted to the views of Smith
and the Pliysiocrats, or cosmopolitanism, see Seligman, Principles of Economics (6th ed. 1914),
116-121. "The most important corollaries of natural law were to them [Smith and the Physi-
ocrats] private property and individual liberty. The liberty whose economic aspect they em-
phasized consisted in complete freedom in internal industry and foreign trade." Ibid., xg.
To the effect that the economic philosophy of the Physiocrats was based upon "natural law
ideas" see: Berolzheimer, The World's Legal Philosophies (X924), 165-i74.
Mansfield was apparently not influenced by the Scotch economist, Adam Smith, whose best
known work did not appear till 1776, after Mansfield's colonial policy had been formulated.
His lectures began at Glasgow as early as 1752, however. Smith, supra note 93, 205. For a dis-
cussion of economic thought prior to Adam Smith, see: Viner, Early English Theories of Trade,
38 Jour. of Pol. Econ. 404, 447 (1930); 2 Muir, British Commonwealth (3d ed. 1924), 126;
Chinard, Correspondence of Jefferson and DuPont de Nemours (1931), xiii, lxii; Malone, Cor-
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Though Mansfield dealt with the common law in a manner so as to permit
it to be adjusted to shifting economic conditions131 and formulated a body
of commercial jurisprudence which fostered exchange, his colonial policy
partook of none of the economic liberalism of Adam Smith.139 As Mans-
field's political and economic orthodoxy has been over-shadowed by his
judicial liberalism; so Blackstone's adoption in the Commentaries of the
former's innovations has been overshadowed by his devotion to the estab-
lished order.' 4"
respondence between Jefferson and DuPont de Nemours (1930), xiii; Adams, Political Essays
of James Wilson (x930), 5.
Birkenhead, English Judges (1926), 172 states that Mansfield was opposed to mercantilism
even prior to Adam Smith. This statement rests on two early arguments of Mansfield. See I4
Hansard, supra note 33, 112, a speech on Dec. i8, 1747, and Chesterfield v. Janson, x Wils.
K.B. 286, 288 (1750).
138 I Sherman, Roman Law in the Modem World (1917), 382; Pound and Plucknett, Read-
ings on the Common Law (1927), 223; i Flanders, supra note 25, 34.
Mansfield, in formulating his body of commercial jurisprudence, rested his decisions in part
on economic policy. For example, he said: "for the sake of commerce, to which the discredit-
ing such notes might be very detrimental" and "the consequences to trade and commerce;
which would be very much incommoded by a contrary determination." See Grant v. Vaughan,
3 Burr. 1516, 1525 (1764) and Miller v. Race, i Burr. 452, 457 (1758).
'39 "A great empire has been established for the sole purpose of raising up a nation of cus-
tomers ..... " 2 Smith, supra note 135, 278. On Feb. 3, 1766, Mansfield in defending the gov-
ernment's colonial policy admitted that, "the Navigation Act shut up their intercourse with
foreign countries. Their ports have been made subject to customs and regulations, which have
cramped and diminished their trade ....." Holliday, supra note 13, 246.
,41 It is to be expected that Blackstone, writing before Adam Smith, would express mer-
cantilist views in his Commentaries and like Mansfield would not be influenced by the newer
school of economic thought. Supra note 133. Yet an economist begins his series of readings on
"the statement of the laissez-faire theory" with an excerpt from Blackstone, followed by selec-
tions from Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham. Hamilton, Current Economic Problems (I915),
9o. It seems odd for the orthodox Blackstone to be classed with these two exponents of eco-
nomic liberalism. Certainly nothing could have irritated Bentham more than to have been
grouped with his law teacher.
Another economist has said that: "The courts have as a general thing absorbed a phi-
losophy which is antiquated, for example, Blackstone's individualistic, eighteenth century
philosophy; far more extreme in its individualism than Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations."
2 Ely, Property and Contract in Relation to the Distribution of Wealth (1914), 676, 708.
